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remains: the indigent will go to jail, while the rich man may
buy his freedom. This seems especially unfair here, where the
judge has already declared that in a particular case the state's
interest could have been satisfied by a fine alone. Another related
and basic issue is whether the sentencing judge, with his
wide range of remedies for a given offense-including fines
and terms of imprisonment-should be allowed to imprison a
defendant solely because he knows or suspects the defendant will
not be able to pay a fine. If the defendant's record and the cir-
cumstances of the commission of the crime indicate that only
a fine is required, then a sentence of imprisonment, due to the
defendant's indigency, contains the same vice of discriminatory
treatment that has been condemned in the instant case, Morris
and Williams.
RICHARD L. WOLL
TAXATION-TREASURY REGULATION VALUING MUTUAL
FUND SHARES FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES AT THE REPLACEMENT
COST HELD INVALID
As the executor of decedent's estate, plaintiff commenced
an action in the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York to recover $3,092.59 in estate taxes and
interest paid on shares held by the decedent at the time of her
death in an open-end investment company (mutual fund)." The
decedent had acquired the shares over a period of years through
gift, inheritance, and reinvestment of capital gains and ordinary
income distributions. The Commissioner had valued the shares
for estate tax purposes at their asked price, that is, the price at
which these shares could be purchased from the mutual fund at
the time of decedent's death.2 Plaintiff contended that the true
value of the shares was reflected in the bid price for such shares,
1. An estate tax is imposed by the INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2001 as follows:
A tax ... is hereby imposed on the transfer of the taxable estate ... of every
decedent, citizen or resident of the United States .... (emphasis added).
2. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (b) (1958), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 417, 419 which
provides as follows:
-Valuation of shares in an open-end investment company. (1) The fair market
value of a share in an open-end investment company (commonly known as a
"mutual fund") is the public offering price of a share ....
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that is, the price at which the mutual fund would redeem them.'
Held, Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8 (b) is unreasonable since
it imposes a tax not only on the value of the shares but also
on the load charge, which does 'not represent any value inher-
ent in the shares and which cannot be' realized by the estate
upon redemption. Cartwright v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 769
(W.D.N.Y. 1971).
The nature and constitutionality of the original federal
estate tax4 was first examined in Knowlton v. Moore,5 where
the Supreme Court rejected the taxpayer's contention that the
estate tax was a direct and unapportioned tax prohibited by
the United States Constitution." Instead, the Court held the tax
to be indirect, imposed not upon the possession or ownership of
property but upon "the happening of an event or an exchange."'
"[D]eath," said the Court, "is the generating source from which
the particular taxing power takes its being and that it is the power
to transmit, or the transmission from the dead to the living,
on which such taxes are more immediately rested."" It is not
the property, then, that is being taxed, but rather the power to
transfer the property.
While the estate tax is levied upon the transfer of property,9
the amount of the tax imposed is determined only after a valua-
tion of the property held by the decedent.10 Generally, the value
3. The current "asked price" is determined by adding to the net asset value of
each share a "load charge" which covers the costs and profits of the broker. The net
asset value is determined by subtracting the mutual fund's liability from assets and
dividing that figure by the number of shares outstanding. The load charge is usually
about 7% of the net asset value. The "bid price" or redemption price is simply the net
asset value. See Lobell, The Mutual Funds: A Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. REV.
181, 182 (1961).
4. WA REv. Aar §§ 29-80, 20 Stat. 448 (1898).
5. 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
6. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 2 provides as follows:
[D]irect Taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be in-
cluded within the Union ....
See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
7. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 47 (1900).
8. Id. at 56.
9. INr. REy. CODE of 1954, § 2001.
10. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b) (1958), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 867, 367-68"
provides as follows:
Valuation of property in general. The value of every item of property includi-
ble in a decedent's gross estate ... is its fair market value at the time of the de-
cedent's death .... The fair market value is the price at which the property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being
under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
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of the property held is determined in relation to the fair market
value of similar property.1 Since personal property is often traded
in one of three possible markets, the price an item of property
will realize upon sale changes as the market context changes.12
Consequently, a definition of market is essential to an application
of the fair market value standard. The Treasury Regulations
have defined market as retail market.'3 Since personal property
generally realizes its highest price on the retail market, it is evi-
dent that the Regulations require a valuation above the amount
which can be realized by the executor. In short, certain property
is to be valued according to its replacement cost, and not in terms
of the amount which the executor could realize upon a sale of
the property.
The apparent harshness of the "retail market test," however,
is partially mitigated by Treasury rulings. First, where an item
of the estate is sold to a "dealer" for less than its fair market
value (as computed under the retail market test), the differ-
ence between its retail value and the price received may be de-
ducted as an administrative expense.' 4 Thus, in the case of an
automobile which must be valued at its retail price," but is
later sold to a dealer for less than the retail price, the difference
relevant facts. The fair market value of a particular item of property includible
in the decedents gross estate is not to be determined by a forced sale price. Nor
is the fair market value of an item of property to be determined by the sale price
of the item in a market other than that in which such item is most commonly
sold to the public, taking into account the location of the item wherever appro.
priate. Thus, in the case of an item of property includible in the decedent's
gross estate, which is generally obtained by the public in the retail market, the
fair market value of such an item of property is the price at which the item or a
comparable item would be sold at retail. For example, the fair market value of
an automobile (an article generally obtained by the public in the retail market)
includible in the decedents gross estate is the price for which an automobile of
the same or approximately the same description, make, model, age, condition,
etc., could be purchased by a member of the general public and not the price
for which the particular automobile of the decedent would be purchased by a
dealer in used automobiles.
11. Id.
12. The general public usually deals in property in one of three markets: (1) pur-
chases at retail; (2) sales to non-merchant individuals; (3) sales to merchants or
dealers. The price any particular item will realize changes as the context changes. For
example, a dealer in used automobiles can obtain a higher price than can an executor
selling the same automobile.
13. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b) (1958), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 Cuss. BULL. 367.
14. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3 (d) (2) (1958), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 367, 368-69.
15. Compare the example in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b) (1958), T.D. 6826, 1965-2
Cum. BULL. 367.
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may be deducted. The net effect, of course, is to tax only the
cash value received by the estate. Secondly, where an item has
been sold via a public auction or a classified ad, the sale price
will be the measure of the property's value for estate tax pur-
poses.1 Since the value is initially reported at the sale price rather
than the retail price, there is no need for a deduction as is the
case where the item is sold to a dealer. It must be noted, how-
ever, that the retail market standard is affected only when there
is a sale of the property-if it is conveyed to a beneficiary, the
retail market price will be treated as the value.17
Determining the value of property according to retail mar-
ket prices for estate and gift tax purposes has found support in
case law. In Guggenheim v. Rasquin,"' the Supreme Court had
to determine whether the value of a single premium life insur-
ance policy for gift tax purposes was the cost of the policy
($850,000.00) or its cash surrender value ($720,000.00). Rea-
soning that the donor did not pay $850,000.00 in order to make a
gift of only $720,000.00, the Court upheld the Commissioner's
contention that the proper value was the replacement cost. Sim-
ilarly, in Estate of Gould," the court held that for gift tax pur-
poses the value of an item of jewelry includes the excise tax
since the donee would have had to pay the tax had he pur-
chased the same ring.
In 1963 the retail market test was applied to mutual funds."
Until this time the Regulations did not specify any particular
standards for valuing mutual funds. At first, such shares could be
reported at their bid prices. 21 Thus, the load charge was not con-
16. Rev. Proc. 65-19, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 1002.
17. This discrepancy may have a rational basis. See p. 263-64 infra.
18. 312 U.S. 254 (1941).
19. 14 T.C. 414 (1950). See also Duke v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 45 U.S. 906 (1952).
20. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (b) (1958), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 Cuss. BULL 417, 419-20.
Although the Regulation may not often be challenged to the point of litigation, there
have been conflicting decisions as to its reasonableness. In Wells v. Commissioner,
50 T.C. 871 (1968) (6 judges dissenting), aff'd sub. nom. Ruehlman v. Commissioner,
418 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1969), the court upheld the Regulation as a reasonable applica-
tion of the willing buyer-willing seller standard. But see Davis v. United States, 306
F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1969), where a California district court held that the Regula-
tion was unreasonable since the estate should be treated as a seller and since the estate
cannot receive more than the bid price, a tax upon the higher asked price is a tax upon
an artificial value.
21. Cartwright v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 769, 771 (W.D.N.Y. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as the instant case].
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sidered part of the value. By the 1960's, however, the load
charge was partially included since mutual fund shares were
treated as common stock,22 and therefore, the mean between
the bid and asked price was taken to be the taxable value. Thus,
one-half of the load charge would be included within the gross
estate. 3 In one sense, however, the comparison of mutual fund
shares and common stock was artificial since common stock may
actually be purchased at or near the mean between the high and
the low bids-whereas shares of mutual funds trade either at the
bid or the asked price, but not in between.24 The application
of a retail market standard to mutual fund shares in 1963, then,
can be seen as an end to the Commissioner's indecision rather
than as a rejection of his prior policy of compromising dis-
puted evaluations.
In the instant case, the court refused to support the Com-
missioner's application of the retail market test in valuing
mutual fund shares held by the decedent at the time of her death.
The first issue faced by the court was to determine whether the
general rule for determining value according to a willing buyer-
willing seller standard should apply. The Commissioner ar-
gued that the only time a willing buyer-willing seller situation
exists is at the sale of the mutual fund shares to the public. Bid
prices, he contended, are set by law; and the mutual fund is re-
quired to redeem its shares. Thus, since the mutual fund acts un-
der a compulsion at the time of redemption, the value of the
shares should be determined at the time of sale to the public.2 5
The court, however, found that the mutual fund was not com-
pelled to make the sale in the first place, but made it with full
knowledge of its duty to repurchase at the bid price.20 Having
freely entered the transaction with the shareholder, the mutual
22. Id.
23. This result is consistent with Commissioner's policy of compromising con-
tested evaluations. See Powell, Estate Valuation-View from the Internal Revenue Sys-
tem's Standpoint, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 249 (1961).
24. Mutual fund shares trade at prices set by law. The prices are not subject to
negotiation and compromise. Investment Company Act of 1940 §§ 1-53, 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 80 (a) (1)- (52) (1941). The asked and bid prices on common stock, however, do not
necessarily represent the prices at which shares are trading since purchases may be made
somewhere between the asked and bid prices.
25. Instant case at 772.
26. Id.
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fund should be treated as a willing buyer at the time of redemp-
tion even though it must redeem the shares at a price set by law.
The court next faced the problem of deciding which of the
two markets should determine value-the market in which shares
are sold to the public or the redemption market. The court selected
the latter for two reasons. First, the Commissioner's desire to
treat the decedent as a member of the buying public ignored
the facts of the case, since the decedent had acquired the shares
not by purchase at the asked price but through gift, inheritance
and acquisition at the redemption price.27 Secondly, the load
charge or sales commission added nothing to the value of the
shares. The court felt that "to include the load charge in the
value of the shares to the estate creates an artifical value that
cannot possibly be obtained by the estate in any readily acces-
sible market.1
28
The Commissioner next contended that valuing the mutual
fund shares in terms of their replacement cost was justified in
light of Guggenheim v. RasquinY° If a life insurance policy
could be valued for gift tax purposes at an amount above that
which could be received upon surrendering the policy for cash,
then a mutual fund share should receive analogous treatment.
Unpersuaded, the court determined that a life insurance policy
involves rights quite different from those found in ownership of
mutual funds. The insurance policy, it asserted, carries with it
not only the right to surrender the contract for cash but also the
right to retain the contract. This added right is of great im-
portance since there is a question of insurability involved, which
is absent in the mutual fund situation. An individual can, at any
time, purchase a mutual fund whereas one's ability to purchase
an insurance contract is not always clear.30
The court in the instant case suggested a second distinction
between mutual fund shares and insurance contracts:
[W]hen death occurs, the insurance company pays under the
policy, the tax is paid, and that is the end of it. Mutual fund




29. 312 U.S. 254 (1941).
30. Instant case at 773.
31. Id.
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The result, the court suggested, is a repetitive tax on a value
which does not exist. In response, the Commissioner argued that
there would, in fact, be no hardship at all. 2 In several revenue
rulings promulgated soon after the retail market test was ap-
plied to mutual funds, the Commissioner provided that where
property is sold by the estate at a price below the retail price, the
difference can be deducted as an administrative expense. 3 Thus,
if the executor in the instant case had redeemed the shares at
the bid price, the estate could have deducted the difference be-
tween the asked and bid prices as an expense. If the shares were
distributed, however, no loss would occur and no deduction could
be made. The court's reply was to the point. "[I]f the regulation
setting fair market value is unreasonable, this unreasonableness
cannot be cured by a regulation which limits the hardship im-
posed upon the taxpayer.
34
Upon initial consideration, the willing buyer-willing seller
rule would seem to be a simple and fair method of valuing prop-
erty. But as can be seen from the instant case, the problem
in applying it is in defining just who is the buyer and who is the
seller. If the estate is the buyer, it is clear that it would have
to pay the asked price for these mutual fund shares. But if the
estate can be treated as the seller and the mutual fund as the buyer,
the value of the shares, defined as cost to the buyer, changes to
the bid price.
To reach its decision, the court in the instant case relied
heavily upon the facts. The decedent never purchased the
shares at the asked price; she received them by gift, inheritance,
and at the redemption price. Apparently the upshot of this is that
the decedent's estate should not be treated as a buyer for purposes
of the willing buyer-willing seller rule because she never paid
the asked price. The court's reading of the willing buyer-willing
seller doctrine is at least curious. What does the method by which
a particular person acquires property have to do with that pro-
perty's value? Is the value of a mutual fund received by gift any
less than one acquired by purchase?
The court's treatment of the manner in which the decedent
acquired the property, however, is of minimal concern since
32. Id.
33. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-8 (d), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 CUT. BULL. 367.
34. Instant case at 778.
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it does not seem to have been the crux of its position. The real
significance in the court's treatment of the estate as a seller is
the fact that the court in effect rejected the retail market test
in general. The court could not understand how an item of prop-
erty could be valued above the amount which could be realized
upon its sale. After all, why should the estate pay a tax based
upon the asked price when it can only realize the bid price through
redemption? The standard of the court, therefore, seems to be
that property held by an estate should not be valued at an amount
greater than that at which it can be sold in the only available
market. If it is presumed that the assets will be liquidated prior
to distribution, this would seem to be a sound position. Under
such circumstances, it may be more reasonable to tax only the
amounts received upon liquidation and not the value of the pro-
perty as determined by a retail market standard since all the
decedent will transfer, and thus all the beneficiary will receive,
is a particular dollar amount. But if we assume that there will
be no liquidation, then the soundness of the court's position be-
comes less clear. The decedent had a choice in making testa-
mentary dispositions. He could have transferred his estate in
kind or in cash. Suppose, for example, that the bid and asked
prices of the shares held by the estate in the instant case were
$17.00 and $19.00 respectively. The decedent could have instructed
the executor to redeem the shares at the bid price and thereafter
distribute the proceeds. Under the proper circumstances, a de-
duction for the difference between the asked price and the
amount received from the redemption is available 5 In this man-
ner, there will not actually be a tax upon the load charge even
though it has been included as part of the gross estate. In short,
the estate will not pay an estate tax on property which it is unable
to transfer. The court in the instant case recognized that this
deduction would correct the apparent over-evaluation required
by Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8 (b). It remained troubled,
however, by the fact that where the estate does not redeem the
shares but instead distributes them, the estate will pay a tax based
upon the asked price ($19.00).
While there may be a discrepancy between the value for
estate tax purposes of mutual funds sold and those distributed,
35. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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this can be justified in view of the fact that what is transferred
in each case is really different. Where the mutual fund is re-
deemed, only the cash received ($17.00) can be distributed, where-
as a distribution of the mutual fund share itself allows the bene-
ficiary to hold property for which he would have had to pay
the asked price ($19.00). Thus, since the estate tax is a transfer
tax, measuring the value of what is actually transferred would
seem to be the objective of any standard of valuation.
The fact that the beneficiary would have had to pay the
asked price in order to purchase similar mutual fund shares
was overlooked by the court. In light of several earlier cases,
however, this fact deserved more attention. In Gould, the court
had to determine whether the excise tax paid by the donor of
a diamond ring should be included as part of the value of the
gift. In determining that the total cost should be taken as the
value, the court reasoned that since the donor wished the donee
to have the diamond ring, he would have given either the ring
or enough cash to buy one. If cash were given, the total amount
would be the value taxed even though part of the cash would be
used to pay the excise tax.
In Guggenheim, the Court determined that the value
of insurance policies for gift tax purposes was the replace-
ment cost and not the cash surrender value. It was held that
"presumptively, the value of these policies at the date of the gift
was the amount which the insured had expended to acquire
them."30l Here the Court recognized that it would be an odd trans-
action, indeed, if the donor paid over $800,000.00 for an insurance
policy in order to make a gift worth only $720,000.00. The
court in the instant case, however, read Guggenheim as being
founded upon the fact that an insurance policy gives the holder a
"bundle of rights. '3 7 One right is to surrender the policy for cash;
another is the right to retain the policy, which is of special im-
portance when the insured is no longer insurable. It is this latter
right that accounts for the difference between the cost of the policy
and its surrender value.
While the "bundle of rights" notion may accurately dis-
tinguish insurance policies and mutual funds, it should be ques-
86. Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254, 257 (1941).
37. Instant cast at 773.
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tioned whether such considerations provide the pr6per analytical
approach to the problem. Justification for applying the retail mar-
ket test to mutual funds probably cannot be found by a compari-
son of the rights inherent 'in insurance policies with those in
mutual fund shares. But does this mean that mutual fund shares
should not be valued for ,estate tax purposes at their replacement
cost? Rather than attempting a juxtaposition of the rights found
in insurance contracts and mutual fund shares, the proper ap-
proach would be to ask how much all of the rights that have been
transferred are worth.
In summary, the decision of the court in the instant case
to declare Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8 (b) unreasonable, carries
beyond the mutual fund situation. The court has redefined the
willing buyer-willing seller rule by treating the estate as the
seller. The court's emphasis upon the particular facts of the
case, that is, that the decedent never acquired the shares by
purchase at the redemption price, to achieve this metamorphosis,
is quite unsupportable. The manner of acquisition clearly is
not a relevant criterion for evaluation.
By treating the estate as the seller, the court has challenged
the entire retail market test. The retail market test, however,
seems to comport with the nature of the tax, namely, to im-
pose a levy upon the decedent's power to transfer property. Since
the estate tax is essentially a transfer tax, it seems proper to
determine the value of the decedent's power of transmission by
measuring the value of that which is transferred. Thus, where
a mutual fund share is transferred, a valuation of the share accord-
ing to retail market prices seems to be justified, since that is the
amount which the beneficiary would have had to pay to acquire
this same share. On the other hand, where the shares are sold by
the executor, and only the proceeds distributed to the beneficiary,
the decedent is actually transferring only the cash received. Under
current Treasury Regulations, 3 only that amount will be taxed.
The retail market test, therefore, and the accompanying regu-
lations and rulings may be seen as an effort on the Commissioner's
part to structure the estate tax so that only the value transferred
will be taxed. The court in the instant case, however, appears to
have indulged in the presumption that the shares will be sold prior
38. Treas. Reg. § 20.2058-3(d) (1958), T.D. 6826,.1965-2 CuM. BULL. 367.
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to a distribution of the estate's assets. The resulting standard does
not permit a valuation above the amount of cash the executor can
realize upon a sale of the mutual fund shares. If this standard is fol-
lowed in other courts, it seems clear that the application of the
retail market test as a whole, and not merely in the area of mutual
fund shares, will be found unreasonable, although the retail mar-
ket test is a fair application of intent of the estate tax.
JAMES E. BROWN
TORTS-LIABILITY OF VEHICLE OWNER TO THIRD PARTIES
INJURED BY THIEF'S NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF VEHICLE, WHERE
KEYS LEFT IN IGNITION LED TO THEFT
On June 28, 1969 between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. defendant,
Gorsky, attended a V.F.W. field day event with a close friend. The
defendant parked his car in the vicinity of the event. At approx-
imately 11:30 p.m. that evening the car was stolen by two youths
aged 16 and 17. The elder thief drove and, as a result of his
negligence, the Gorsky vehicle collided with a car driven by the
plaintiff, Guaspari, and occupied by his wife and daughter. The
plaintiff brought actions against the defendant for personal
injuries, medical expenses, property damages and wrongful death.
The actions were based on the defendant's alleged violation of
New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law, section 1210 (a),' the plain-
tiff claiming that the defendant left the keys in the ignition.
Both Gorsky and his friend testified that the keys were removed
from the ignition, but that a spare set was left in the glove
compartment of the car. However, the thief testified that the keys
were in the ignition when he entered the vehicle, though his
testimony was attenuated by the discovery that the other thief
had entered the automobile first and searched the glove com-
partment. Jury verdicts were rendered for the plaintiff and the
defendant appealed on the law and facts. The Appellate Divi-
sion for the Fourth Department affirmed. Held, defendant's
1. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 1210 (a) (McKinney 1970) provides:
"No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand
unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition, removing the key from
the vehicle ......
